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THE MORAL EXCLUSIVITY OF THE NEW CIVIL SOCIETY
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS*

INTRODUCTION

When I was a little girl, I learned a folk tale about the fate of
naughty children on Christmas morning. They receive gifts wrapped
nicely in beautiful paper and tied with pretty ribbons, nestled under
the family 's evergreen tree. But when they open up the lovely
package, the children discover to their horror that it is filled with
coals. I experienced the same sensation of initial enticement,
followed by dismay, in reading recent appeals to revive civil society. 1
They come in an attractive package bearing principles of equal
citizenship and solidarity that opens to a largely exclusionary and
regressive agenda. Many of the revivalists' basic axioms for civic
renewal are commendable. Their call to sustain our "commitment to
freedom and justice for all," 2 their concern for the local institutions
that foster citizenship, and their insistence on a public moral
philosophy to animate civic engagement are important elements of a
more democratic and egalitarian society. 3 But the translation of these
admirable principles into a concrete program centered on traditional
morality and modes of association takes an unfortunate turn.
* Pro fessor, North wes tern University School of Law; F acult y Fellow, Institute for Policy
Research.
1. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY D EMOCRACY
NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS (1998); N ATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC R ENEWAL, A NATION OF
SPECTATORS: How CIVIC DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN Do
ABOUT IT (1998) . I will call the conte mpo rary gro up of schola rs whose views are incorporated
in these reports "civil society revivalists."
2. COUNCIL ON C IVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, a t 3.
3. I have advocated each of these precepts in my own writing. See, e.g., Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Wh o Have Babies: Women of Color, Eq uality, an d the Right of
Privacy, 104 H ARV. L. RE V. 1419, 1471-82 (1991) (developing an inte rpretation of constitutional
equal protection and privacy that would enhance fr eedom and justice); D orothy E. R oberts,
Sources of Commitmem to Social Justice, 4 RO GER WILLIAMS L. REV. 175, 195-203 (1 998)
(advoca ting a moral commitme nt to social justice as the source of public support for more
ega litarian policies) ; D orothy E. R oberts, W elfare an d th e Problem of Black Citizens/z ip , 105
YALE L.J. 1563, 1595-1602 (1996) (book review) (proposing an approac h that incorporates both
Black commun ity development and self-d etermination and national welfare po licies to
stre ngt hen Black citizenship).
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Beneath the appeals to equality and justice lies a conception of civil
society more concerned with rescuing a disappearing way of life than
with ending persistent economic and social disparities. 4
What results is a moral vision marred by exclusivity. 5 I mean this
in two senses: civil society revivalists promote a narrow meaning of
morality that excludes social justice from its heart; their plan for
reform consequently privileges those who benefit most from societal
inequality and penalizes those who are most injured by it. Most
notably excluded is a serious recognition of past and present racism
and its fatal impact on any effort to forge a common civic purpose
among Americans. 6
This essay begins by locating the source of the revivalists' moral
exclusivity in their flawed account of the relationship between social
inequality and moral decline. First, the revivalists attribute both the
widening gap between America's haves and have-nots and the
erosion of a shared civic faith more to recent decay than to enduring
systemic injustice. Second, they reinforce depreciation of social
justice in their agenda by attributing the decline in morals in part to
the success of movements aimed at reducing systemic inequalities and
4. Civil socie ty revivalists also worry about a deception possibly created by their pretty
package . See, e.g., E .J. Dionne, Jr. , Why Civil Society? Why Now? . in COMMUNITY WORKS:
TH E REVIVAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN AMERICA 1, 1 (E.J. Dionne, Jr., ed ., 1998) (" ' Civil society'
sounds so nice that fe w people can believe something serious lies behind the debate th e idea h as
provoked ."). I ta ke very seriously the agenda behind the civil society revivalists' nice words .
5. Both A Ca ll to Civil Society and A Nation of Sp ecrators ret1ect this unde rlying morality.
A Call to Civil Sociecy emphasizes the need for public moral re newaL while A N ation of
Speccators is more concerned with increasing civic engagement. See Don Eberly, Civic Renewal
vs. Moral Renewal, POL'Y REV. , Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 44. Despite these divergent priorities,
ho wever, both reports stress the importance of shared , public values to the civic health of the
nation. Bo th consider from diffe rent vantages the re lationship be twee n citizens' civic and
ethical life. I am interested he re in the moral vision that anima te s civil society revivalists'
understanding of this relati onship.
6. This inattention to the impact that systemic racial exclusion has on civil society is
contrary to the prior work of Cornel West, who signed A Call to Civil Sociecy. See generally
CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993) . West's message that race matters is muted by th e
revivalists' overriding project of attributing the erosion of a shared civic fa ith to moral declin e.
See Cornel West, Nihilism in Black America, D ISSENT, Spring 1991, a t 221 (attributing the
erosion of Black civil society largely to a kind of mora l decay, including " the profound sense of
psychological depression , personal worthlessness, and social despair "). The participation of
several African Americans in drafting A Call to Civil Society does not refute my criticism. See
Jean Bethke Elshtain , Will the Real Civil Society Advocates Please Stand Up?, 75 CH I.- KENT L.
REV. 583, 586 (2000) (responding to my criticism by noting that " the Council on Civil Society
included in its ranks distinguished African America n schola rs an d activists."). My critique
concerns the substance of the revivalists' platform, not the credentials or race of its signa tories.
Black social theorists have long disagreed about the causes, extent, and nat ure o.f racial
inequality, as well as the strategies for combati ng it. See gen era!ly AFRICAN INTELLECTUAL
HERITAGE (Mo!efi Kete Asa nte & Ab u S. A barry eds ., 1996). Perhaps many of the revivalists
are deeply troubled by racia l and other forms of systemic injustice , but their concern is muted
by their overriding project of attri buting the erosion of a shared civic fait h to moral decline.
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by denouncing some of the movements' most effective tools. In the
revivalists' moral universe, the focus on weakening morals eclipses
the ugly reality of entrenched economic and social disparities.
I then explain how the revivalists' association between equality
and moral decline produces strategies that benefit and protect
predominantly white middle-class families while devaluing the family
ties of less privileged people. For one thing, these strategies rely
excessively on ensuring that children are raised by parents who are
married. By discounting the importance of social justice for creating
civic faith, involvement, and solidarity, their proposals could do more
to defend the social order than to renew civil society. 7
I. THE EXCLUSIVE MEANING OF MORALITY
It is important to note at the outset that there is no ineluctable

connection between the revivalists' exclusive understanding of
morality and the role of civil society. The revivalists tend to conflate
their peculiar definition of morality, and set of indicators of moral
decline, with the meaning of civil society. 8 But the moral standards
animating civil society need not have anything to do with the
condemnation of divorce and out-of-wedlock births. One can agree
that democracy needs moral truths and that shared public values
promote civic engagement, without subscribing to the particular
moral truths espoused by the Institute for American Values.
A sociological perspective on civil society recognizes that the
shape it takes in any nation at any moment in history is influenced by
prevalent cultural and political forces. 9 The Marxist perspective on
7. For somewhat different reasons, Jean L. Cohen expresses a similar worry about the
re vivalists' conceptualization of civi l society: "Unless this model is corrected, the current revival
of the discourse of civil socie ty in the United States will play into the hands of social
conservatives who aim to re traditionalize civic life and to substitute loca l ' volunteerism' for the
public se rvices and redistributi ve efforts of the welfare state , as if these are the only options we
have. " J ea n L. Cohen, American Civil Rights Talk, in CIVIL SOCIETY. D EMOCRACY, AND
CIVIC RENEWAL 55-56 (Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1999). Cohen argues that most revivalists
incorrectly equate civil society with traditional forms of voluntary group associations, omitting
the cruc ial category of the public sphere. See id. at 56, 67 ("[I]t is the link of the reductionist
conception of civil society to the discourse of civic decline that makes this approach ambiguous,
and so prone to ideological misuse.").
8. Indeed , as Professor Elshtain 's indignant response illustrates, reviva lists seem offended
by the suggestion of competing models of civil socie ty by those with id eological perspectives
different from their own. See E lshtain , supra note 6, at 597-99 (accusing me of " readin g
everything through a distorting ideological le ns"). Of course ideological di ffer ences shape ideas
about the culture and politics of civil society-A Call to Civil Society is hardl y a neutral
sta tement of moral values and policy choices!
9. See Robe rt W. Hefner, Civil Society: Cultural Possibility of a Modern Ideal, SOCIETY,
!Viar. -Apr. 1998, at 16. Americans used to revivalists' rh etoric of m oral conformity might be
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civil society expressed by Antonio Gramsci reveals further the
political relevance of divergent discourses of civil society.10 As
political scientist Jean Cohen describes it, "competing conceptions of
civil society are deployed in a continual struggle either to maintain
cultural hegemony by dominant groups or to achieve counterhegemony for subordinate collective actors." 11 The very nature of
civil society suggests that its ideals are never pre-determined or
stagnant, but constantly refined through the process of citizen
engagement.l 2 "[I]t is less the beat of ancient associational drums that
determines democracy's rhythms than it is a thoroughly
contemporary circle of organizations and values," notes
anthropologist Robert Hefner. 13
In other words, there is nothing in the political function of civil
society that necessitates the marriage-centered norms embraced by
civil society's most vocal champions. We may reject their model of
family structure, economic system, and social order, and still
appreciate the benefits of civil society. My purpose in this essay is to
point out the weakness of this moral ideology as a basis for civil
society rather than to jettison the concept of civil society altogether.
The question remains, does the particular moral vision promoted
by today's revivalists foster civil society better than others? The point
of moral renewal in civil society is not to establish a fixed set of
preferred values enforced by the state. To the contrary, civil society
is the sphere of culture that avoids state domination where values can
be freely "debated, contested, and changed." 14 Civil society adherents
should be interested in fostering a public morality that will protect
this arena of ethical life and promote civic involvement by all citizens.
I hope to show that by excluding social justice from the center of its
concern, the revivalists' understanding of morality offends this basic

surprised to learn that E aste rn European intellectuals we re attracte d to civil society's
democratic pluralism. See Krishan Kumar, Civil Society: An Inquiry into th e Usefuln ess of an
Historical Term , 44 BJS 375, 375 (1993) .
10. See Antonio Gramsci, State and Civil Society, in SELECTIONS FROM PRISON
NOTEB OO KS 206 (1971 ).
11. Cohen , supra note 7, at 57.
12. See H efner, supra note 9, a t 26 ("[T]he values of civil socie ty are , by their very nature,
e ve r-unfinished. "); see also Cohen , supra note 7, at 57 (" [T]he cultural dimen sion of civil society
is not given or na tural ; rathe r, it is a site of social contestation: its associations and ne tworks are
a terrain to be struggled ove r, and an arena in which collective iden tities, e thica l values, and
allia nces are for ged. ").
13. See H e fn e r, supra no te 9, a t 26.
14. Kumar, supra note 9, at 383.
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tenet of democratic civility. 15
The revivalists do not ignore altogether America's social
hierarchies and their attendant disparities of wealth and privilege. A
Call to Civil Society, for example, emphasizes throughout the text that
"we suffer from growing inequality. " 16 Rather, at the heart of their
moral exclusivity is a flawed understanding of the relationship
between inequality and moral decline. The revivalists make two
claims about this relationship. First, they assert that moral decline
fosters inequality: growing disparities in Americans' material wellbeing stem largely from gr?wing moral weaknesses in families and
norms of personal responsibilityY Second, they associate equality
with moral decline: dramatic advances by disenfranchised groups in
the last forty years have contributed to the moral degeneration of
families and other aspects of civic life. 18 This conception of the
relationship between equality and moral decline discounts both the
immorality of social inequities themselves, and the way social
inequities hinder civic engagement.
A. Moral Decline Causes Inequality
A Call to Civil Society begins by linking two deficiencies in
contemporary U.S. society: "First, we suffer from growing inequality.
And second, we suffer from moral depletion. " 19 Relying largely on
public opinion polls, the report defines moral weakness as "behavior
that threatens family cohesiveness . . . behavior that is increasingly
uncivil-that reflects a rejection of legitimate authority and a lack of
respect for others . . . [and] behavior that violates the norm of
personal responsibility. "20 The revivalists then try to establish a
causal connection between inequality and moral decline. They blame
moral degeneracy for the material manifestations of economic and
social injustice. Thus, A Call to Civil Society attributes a long list of
social ills from declining child and adolescent well being, to high
15. Although th e civil society revivalists often p ositi on th e mse lves against liberals, both
have been guilty of setting aside social justice from their m o ral vision. I have e lsewhere
criticized d ominant liberal ideology fo r this o mission . See D OROTHY E. R OBERTS, KILLING
THE BLACK B ODY 294 (1 997 ); see also D orothy E. R o berts, Social Justice, Procreative Liberty
and th e Limits of Liberal Th eory: Robertson 's Children of Choice, 20 L. & Soc. INQU IR Y l005
(1 995) (book rev iew).
16. See COUNCIL ON CI VIL SOc'Y, sup ra note 1, at 4, 15, 26.
17. See id. at 5-6.
18. See infra notes 72-78 and acco mp anying tex t.
19. C OUNCl L ON CI VIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 4.
20. !d. a t 5.
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levels of violence and disorder, to worsening relations between races,
economic classes, and generations to declining morality, rather than
to inequalities of wealth and power. 21
Linking the ill effects of societal inequality to moral degeneracy
shifts the focus from injustice to moral weakness and obscures
inequality itself as one of U.S. society's chief immoralities. This move
from inequality to moral decline is reflected in the revivalists'
The revivalists'
concrete strategies to restore civil society.
recommendations barely recognize the moral imperative to reduce
poverty or eliminate systemic racism, proposing such paltry efforts as
establishing mentoring programs for juvenile offenders. 22 Instead,
they are primarily concerned with shifting authority over existing
anti-poverty services from the federal government to institutions of
civil society, such as local religious organizations. A lthough A Call to
Civil Society acknowledges that "our economic activities and
institutions are not exempt from the need for moral renewal," it does
not make the transformation of economic relations a critical part of
moral renewal.2 3 Under this view, moral restoration requires
marriage, respect for authority, and personal responsibility, and these
principles should help to govern the economic sphere.
Civil society revivalists claim, then , that the widening gap in U.S.
wealth and privilege is driven largely by moral decline, while failing to
highlight our tolerance of this gap as itself immoral. The new civil
society could just as well grow from a public morality that is more
disgusted by persistent social inequities and a moral truth that makes
social justice a chief concern. We could begin with the revivalists'
fundamental principle that all persons possess equal dignity, their
view of people as intrinsically social beings, and their aim to nurture a
space for citizen engagement undomina ted by either the market or
the state, yet prescribe a very different agenda. An alternative
agenda might strengthen the institutions of civil society by aggressive
efforts to relieve poverty and redress longstanding barriers to
housing, jobs, and political participation. It might build solidarity
around a commitment to engage in collective action for systemic
change.
So far I have described the civil society revivalists ' focus on
moral decline and suggested an alternative moral vision that places
21. Id. at 6.
22. See id. at 21.
23. !d. at 16.

i
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social justice squarely at its center. But is there any reason for civil
society to adopt this alternative definition of social morality? Social
justice may be an important concern for any moral society, but it may
be irrelevant or ancillary to the particular mission of civil society.
There is strong evidence, however, that eliminating systemic
inequality is an essential strategy for fostering civil society. As
sociologist Caroline Hodges Persell puts it, " [c]ivil society and social
justice are interdependent." 24 Persell traces the decline in civil society
in the last two decades to structural economic transformation in the
United States that produced dramatic changes in income
distribution. 25 In the period from 1979 to 1989, for example , the
richest 20% of households reaped 97% of economic gains while the
bottom 20% saw a net decline in their share of earnings. 26 More
recent data show the gap between rich and poor is widening: "this
year, the richest 2.7 million Americans, the top 1 percent, will have as
many after-tax dollars to spend as the bottom 100 million." 27 The
richest one-fifth have a bigger share of the economic pie than they did
in 1977, while the share of the one-fifth with the lowest incomes is
smaller. 28
Persell argues that these economic inequalities are undermining
civil society because "economic distress is negatively related to social
capital. " 29 Citing the empirical work of sociologists William Julius
Wilson and Elijah Anderson, she points out the importance of decent
jobs and economic security for family and community stability. 30
Huge disparities in income, moreover, reinforce class divisions and
make it harder for citizens to perceive that they share a common
moral purpose. 31
There is also evidence that poverty, social isolation, and
inadequate education reduce levels of political participation. 32 A
survey of Blacks in D etroit fro m different income levels showed that
24.
Soc. F.
25.
26.
27.

Caroline Hodges Persell, The Interdependence of Social Justice nnd Civil Society, 12
149, 154 (1997).
See id. at 154-56.
See id. at 154.
David Cay Johnston, Gnp Between Rich and Poor Found Substantially Wider, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at A14.
28. See id.
29. See Persell, supra note 24, at 158, 164.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 164.
32. See Frederick C. Harris , Will the Circle Be Unbroken? The Erosion and Tmnsjomwtion
of African American Civic Life, in CIVIL S OCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL supra
note 7, at 317, 329-34.
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those living in poor neighborhoods were less likely to engage in civic
activities, belong to a church, attend community meetings, or
contribute money to political candidates. 33 In Code of the Street
Elijah Anderson reveals a violently enforced set of informal rules-'
the "code of the street"- that has replaced the rules of civil law in
inner-city Philadelphia and competes with parents' attempts to train
their children to be good citizens. 34 The code of the street flourishes
not because the residents are not decent enough, but because of their
community's multiple deprivations: "a trying socioeconomic context
in which family-sustaining jobs have become ever more scarce, public
assistance has increasingly disappeared, racial discrimination is a fact
of daily life, wider institutions have less legitimacy, legal codes are
often ignored or not trusted, and frustration has been powerfully
building for many residents." 35
Civil society revivalists dismiss the key role systemic inequality
plays in weakening the institutions of civil society by artificially
excluding the issue of social justice from their project. David
Blankenhorn, for example, considers three alternative strategies that
rich countries might adopt to strengthen civil society: a welfare state
strategy based on government programs, a laissez-faire strategy based
on free market incentives, and a strategy based directly on restoring
the institutions of civil society. 36 Blankenhorn recognizes certain
advantages of the welfare state model that uses government measures
to increase economic security and reduce economic inequalityY
Despite its potential for state imperialism, the welfare state
counteracts the deleterious influence of unconstrained market forces,
which Blankenhorn suggests are partly responsible for the United
States' distinction as "the modern world's weakest and most rapidly
declining family system. " 38
Blankenhorn rejects the welfare state strategy, however, because
it cannot perform the chief function of civil society: it cannot train

33. See Cathy J. Cohen & Michael C. Dawson, Neighborhood Poverty and African
American Politics, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 286, 297-98 (1993).
34. See generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND
THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (1999).
35. !d. at 11.
36. David Blankenhorn, The Possibility of Civil Society, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE:
SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERCIAN SOCIETY 271, 280
(Mary Ann Glendon eta!. eels., 1995).
37. See id. at 278.
38. Jd.at278-79.
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:::hildren to be good citizens. 39 Jean Bethke Elshtain similarly
:lismisses concern about social problems from the particular aims of
:::ivil society: "Civil society isn't so much about problem solving as
about citizen and neighbor creating. Then and only then will we work
together on other desired ends." 4° Civil society's job of forming good
citizens becomes an excuse for setting aside systemic economic and
social change from the revivalists' concrete policy recommendations. 41
But why must we view the welfare state as a substitute for civil
And why must we view solving social problems as
society?
disconnected from the task of creating good citizens and neighbors?
There is no need to choose between state institutions aimed at
ameliorating disastrous economic disparities and the institutions of
civil society. These two sets of institutions can complement each
other. Theda Skocpol's study of the emergence of large voluntary
groups m America, for example, demonstrates the historical
importance of federal government programs in promoting civic
activismY Skocpol observes, " [c]ontrary to the conservative view
that federal social policies are harmful to voluntary groups, popularly
rooted voluntary associations have often grown up in a mutually
beneficial relationship with federal policies, including federal 'taxand-spend' programs." 43 Local and federal efforts to achieve a more
egalitarian society can facilitate a parallel mission to revitalize civil
39. See id. at 279.
40. Jean Bethke Elshtain , Not a Cure-All: Civil Society Creates Citizens, It Does Not Sol ve
Problems, in COMMUNITY WORKS: THE REVIVAL OF CIVI L SOCIETY JN AMERIC A 24. 27 (E.J.
Dionne, Jr., ed., 1998).
41. As the preceding discussion sho uld make appare nt, the revivalists' insistence " that civil
society is not primarily problem-oriented (the cure-all idea) but citize nship creating" has no t
eluded me as Professor Elshtain charges. See Elshtain , supra note 6, at 586. Rathe r, I argue
that this distinction betwe en problem solving and citize nship creation is no t only artificial, but
one the revivalists do no t consistently embrace. Thus, they use this dichotomy selective ly to
dismiss national programs to redistribute wealth and privilege, while inviting governme nt
intervention, such as tax policy and welfare regulation , to promote marriage. See COUNCIL ON
CIVIL Soc' Y, supra note 1, at 19, 20. A Call to Civil So ciety and A Nation of Spectators arc
certainly oriented toward solving the proble ms of divorce a nd single parenting. Our
disagreement , the n, is over which problems threaten civil socie ty the most. Similarly, the
revivalists are no more co ncern ed about "actual conditi ons on the ground " than I am , although
we may view these conditions differently. See id. My contention is that the re vivalists ' atte ntio n
to fixing " moral decline " as distinct from "socia l proble ms" in the nam e of citize nship cre atio n
is both theoretically and empirica lly indefen sibl e and m ay ultimately do civil society m ore harm
than good.
42. See Theda Skocpol , Don't Blame B ig Governm en£: America's Voluntary Groups Thri ve
in a National Network , in COMM UN ITY WORKS: TH E R EVIVAL OF CIViL SOCIETY IN AM ERI CA ,
supra note 40, at 37.
43. !d. at 39; see also Cohen , sup ra note 7, at 77 (" It is not necessa ry to choose be twee n an
istitutionalist and an associa tiona list path to the crea tio n of social trust. These can be mutuall y
interdepe nde nt and rein fo rcing. ").
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society. This mission, moreover, must include solving social problems
to create citizens with the ability and motivation to work together.
Civil society revivalists overemphasize the significance of moral
decline and underestimate the importance of social justice because of
a profound misunderstanding of the depths and impact of social
divisions in the United States. The revivalists blame moral decline for
eroding our sense of common humanity. They assume that peeling
away the layer of moral decay that accumulated over the past few
decades will reveal a "common civic faith and shared moral
philosophy." 44 It is as if an acute dementia erased America's racist
history and its persistent effects from the revivalists' memory.
Only the foggiest romanticism could fondly recall "our political
and social egalitarianism, which allowed individuals of all stations to
mingle and work together in common endeavors. " 45 For most of
American history, Blacks were barred by law from civic participation,
including voting, holding public office, and serving on juries;46 a rule
of racial purity helped to preserve white supremacy. 47 The colonists
originally established a clear demarcation between Black slaves and
white masters by a violently implemented system of racial
classifications and sexual taboos.
A paramount objective of
American law and social convention was keeping the white bloodline
free from Black contamination and excluding Blacks from the
privileges of whiteness. 48 This racial caste system was upheld by law
for three centuries, officially discredited only in recent decades by

44. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y , supra note 1, at 26.
45. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra n ote 1, at 39.
46. See Kenneth L. K a rst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95 , 112-13. See generally Scott v. Sandford, 60
U .S. 393, 412 (1857) ("[Blacks] have never been regarded as a part of th e people of citizens of
th e Sta te, nor supposed to possess any political rights which th e dominant race might not
withhold or grant at th e ir please. " ); C. VANN WOODW ARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JI M
CROW 67-109 (3d ed. 1974) (describin g the creation and im p le mentati o n of Jim Crow statutes
fo llowing Reconstruction); Randall K enn edy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal
History of th e Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1006-07 (1989) (discussing
segregation in the public sphere).
47. See A. Leon Higginbo tham , Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial
Sex in the Law of Colonial Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1967-68 (1989). See
generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAN, JR. , IN THE MATTER OF COLOR : RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS : THE COLONIAL PERI OD (1978) ; WI NTHROP JORD AN, WHITE
OVER BLACK: AMERICAN A ITITUDES T OWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1 812 (1969).
48. See Cheryl I. H arris, Wh iteness as Property, 106 H ARV. L. REV. 1707, 1745-46 (1993)
(describing th e legal deve lopme nt of a " property interest in white ness" that au tom at ica ll y
enti tles whites in the United States to a privileged status). On the laws that defined whiteness,
see generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE L EGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996) .
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Supreme Court decrees such as Brown v. Board of Education 49
(overturning the separate but equal doctrine in 1954) and Loving v.
Virginia 50 (invalidating anti-miscegenation laws in 1967).
Civil society revivalists forget that "the intellectual inheritance of
our civilization" includes scientific racism, which justified this racial
hierarchy, as much as the enlightenment principles of equality and
freedom. Scientific racism understands racial variation as a biological
distinction that determines social superiority and inferiority. 51 It
explains white domination of other races as the natural order of
things. Only a theory rooted in nature could systematically account
for the anomaly of slavery existing in a republic founded on a radical
commitment to the ideals civil society revivalists admire. 52
These are not isolated events from a distant past that we can
regret and then put aside as we move forward to restore civil society.
This history created a culture, established institutions, and instilled
expectations of privilege based on a racial hierarchy that negated the
possibility of civic solidarity across racial lines. Institutional barriers
continue to hinder minorities' participation in the nation's economic
and political life and a sense of common humanity. Under racist
ideology, moreover, whites perceive their interests in opposition to
those of Blacks because Blacks' social advancement diminishes white
superiority. The jurisprudence of racial realism posits that white
A mericans have repeatedly sacrificed Black people's interests to
maintain their privileged position; legal measures that improve
African-Americans' status are implemented only if they also further
the in terests of the white majority.53 Some people consider it uncivil
for minorities to make dem ands for equal citizenship that do not
appeal to whites' self interest. 54
'Nhite Americans have therefore been unwilling to pay for
subsidies and to engage in social reforms thought to benefit Blacks. 55
'Vhite workers resisted labor reform during Reconstruction that
49. 347 U .S. 483, 495 (1954).
50. 388 U.S .1 , 11-12 (1967).
51. See STEPH EN JAY GOULD, THE M ISMEAS URE OF MAN 30-39 (1981).
52. See Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race, and Ideology in 1he Uniled States of America,
181 NEW LEFT R EV. 95 , 101-02, 106-07, 114 (1990).
53. Se e DERRICK BELL, FAC ES AT THE Bon·oM OF THE WELL: THE PER MANE NCE OF
RA CISM 97-99 (1992): see also Derrick A . Bell, Jr., Bro wn v. Board of Edu cation an d the
Interest-Conve rgence Dilemma , 93 H ARV. L REV. 518. 523 (1980).
54. At a recent meeting of the A merican Society of Political and Legal Philosophy,
Lawrence ]\;le ad acc used me of being "uncivil" because I made an argument based on racial
justice that did not appeal to white people's interests .
55. See B ELL, supra note 53, at 8.
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would have incorporate_d freed slaves i?to the labor market. 56 Nearly ·.;: ,~: 1
a century later, a white backlash dismantled the 1960s War on · _;;.;j
Poverty programs when they began to improve the material status - :: ~
and increase the political power of the Black urban poorY This racial .· :.~
antipathy does not bode well for renewing a shared civic purpose:
J
For centuries in this country ... blacks have served as the group
whose experiences and private needs have been suppressed in
order to promote "the common good " of whites. Indeed, the
"shared values" in which the antifederalists laid faith included a
historically constant and (for whites) a unifying belief in the inferior
and subordinated position of black Americans. 58

The common good is an elusive ideal when one group defines its
welfare in terms of the continued subordination of another. 59
These racial attitudes pervade every aspect of U.S. civil society.
Just as strong as white Americans' "proclivity to associate" is their
proclivity to disassociate from Blacks. The most graphic reflection of
In
this racial separation is persistent residential segregation.
A merican Apartheid, Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A . Denton
demonstrate that the concentration of poor Blacks in urban centers
resulted from systemic racial discrimination in the public and private
housing markets. 60 The geographic isolation of Blacks in inner-cities
has profound civic consequences. As Margaret Weir explains , "it
transforms the problems of living in cities into 'black' problems,
making it easier for politicians to solve urban problems at the expense
of poor black residents." 61 Massey and Denton tie residential

56. See WI LLIA M ED WARD B URGHA RDT D UBO IS. BLACK RE CONSTR UCTION IN
AMER ICA 700 (1962).
57. See JIL L QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: H OW R AC ISM UNDERMINES THE
W AR ON POVERTY 78, 195 -96 (1994) .
58. De rri c k Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE LJ.
1609, 1610-11 (1 988) .
59. Eve n progressive refo r me rs h ave a dvoca te d r ace-neutra l progra m s in ho pes tha t th ey
ca n garne r m ore suppo r t fro m white A m e rica ns than th e vilif ie d we lfa re program s the public
associates with B lack people . See, e.g. , LINDA GORD ON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE
MOTHERS AND THE HISTO RY OF W ELFA RE, 1890-1 935, a t 304-05 (1994) (cri ticizing ta rge ted
we lfare polic ies and noting th at "a bigge r we lfa re state is like ly to be a m o re p o p u lar o ne");
W ILLIAM JULI US WI LSON, THE TRU LY D ISAD VANTAGED : TH E INNE R CITY, THE
UND ERCLASS, AND P UBLIC P OLICY 120 (1987) (" The hidden agenda is to improve the life

chances of gro ups such as rhe ghetto underc/ass by emphasizing p rograms in which the more
advantaged grou ps of all races can positively relate." ). I critique th ese universalist ap peals in
R oberts, supra no te 3, at 1588-92.
60. DOUGLASS. MASSEY & NANCY A DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 51-59, 96-105
(1993 ).
61. Margare t We ir, From Equal Opportunity to " The New Social Con trau ": Race and the
Poli1ics of rhe American "Underc/ass," in R ACISM, THE CITY AND T HE STATE 93 (Malcolm
C ross & M icha el Ke ith eds ., 1993) .
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segregation to Blacks' extreme economic, social, and political
isolation from mainstream society and to the resulting endurance of
_Black poverty.
The authors' striking observation about the
unparalleled degree of Blacks' exclusion from white civic life should
send chills up any civil society revivalists' spine: "Ironically, within a
large, diverse, and highly mobile post-industrial society such as the
. United States, blacks living in the heart of the ghetto are among the
most isolated people on earth. No other group in the contemporary
United States comes close to this level of isolation within urban
society. " 62
This American apartheid was not a natural or inevitable
consequence of benign racial preferences. These impoverished
ghettos were consciously created by white real estate brokers and
banks, supported by antiblack violence, federal housing policy, and
legal rules such as restrictive covenants. 63 To this day, racial
discrimination in mortgage lending and real estate sales helps to
maintain housing segregation. 64
Elshtain responds to "Accusations of Nostalgia," such as mine,
by pointing out that she is well aware that "many bad things
happened and are happening in America." 65 The problem is not that
civil society revivalists do not know the awful history of slavery, the
annihilation of Native Americans, and women's second-class status,
however. It is that they deliberately ignore this history in describing
America's civic past and the potential for civic renewal. They rely on
this amnesia to set aside the need for structural change in favor of
reversing moral decline. Elshtain hurls the charge of nostalgia back
at progressives who stubbornly refuse to relinquish their faith in
federal government to solve social problems. 66 They should also come
to grips with the fact that "not all our problems are fixable," she
admonishesY The degree of tolerance we have for gross disparities in
wealth and privilege-the extent to which we believe these problems
are fixable-is a matter of moral conviction. Civic revivalists
advocate an exclusive morality that seeks to repair America's moral
deficiencies such as divorce and personal irresponsibility while
62. MASSEY & D ENTON , supra note 60, at 77.
63. See i~ at17-59,87.
64. See Keith Bradshe r, A Second Fed Bank Sw dy Finds Disparities in Mortgage Lending,
N.Y. TI MES, July 13, 1995, at D1 ; see also Pete r T. Kilborn , Bias Worsens f or Minorities Buy ing
Homes. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1999, at Al 5.
65. Elshtain , supra no te 40, at 24 , 26 .
66. /d. at 27.
67. !d.
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lacking the conviction to challenge an unjust social order.
Another response to the problem that racism poses for civil
society might emphasize the development of Black civic institutions
and associations that do not rely on white people's assistance or
approval. As Regina Austin wisely advocates:
Although blacks must resist white supremacy at every turn, blacks
should also recognize the inadequacy of the concessions white
supremacy is likely to accord them and proceed on the assumption
that they must generate and sustain a black public sphere, that is, a
space in which they can pursue the good life both in spite of white
people and without regard to them. 68

This model of separate civic arenas is more realistic, although it
may not be what most revivalists had in mind. But the commitment
to building independent Black institutions of civil society need not
negate the pursuit of systemic economic and social change in
America. Black communities currently lack the resources needed to
raise the masses of Black people out of poverty. Without a radical
objective, moreover, Black localism may simply accommodate the
prevailing social order. At the inception of the War on Poverty, for
example, whites found the concept of "community development"
reassuring because "they understood it to mean that the assault would
be on the 'pathology of the ghetto,' not on white stakes in
neighborhoods, schools, jobs, or public services. " 69 Strengthening
Black civic life is important, but, just like the rest of civil society, this
effort must seek to abolish A merica's systemic injustices.
The history of institutionalized racial exclusion, reinforced by a
white supremacist ideology, suggests that any effort to improve civic
engagement and social connectedness must place at its center the
eradication of racial and other social stratifications. The lesson to be
learned from the Founders is that their "moral idea that all persons
possess equal dignity" was strangled by their practice of holding
human beings in bondage.70 Their hypocrisy, along with racism's
intransigence, should counsel against the naive faith in the moral
power of these ideals alone to bring about a civil society. By
68. Regina A ustin , Beyond B lack Demons & White D evils: Antiblack Co nspiracy
Th eoriz in g & th e B la ck Public Sph ere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv . 1021 , 1042-43 (1 995) ; see also
Regin a Austin , "An Honesr Living ": Street Vendors, J'v!unicipal Regulation, and th e Black Public
Sph ere , 103 Y ALE L.J. 2119, 2119-20 (1 994) . Austin 's ad vice echoes Malco lm X 's e xhortation 30
years ago that Blacks were "wastin g (their) time a ppe aling to th e moral conscie nce of a
bankrup t man like Uncle Sam." MALCO LM X SPEAKS 40 (George Breitman ed., 1965).
69. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & R ICHARD A. C LOWARD. R EGU LATING THE POOR: THE
FU NCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 276 (197 1).
70. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOc'Y, supra note 1. at 13.
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constantly referring to a mythical shared civic past, the revivalists
pretend that today's inequalities are caused by a recent decline in
morals. Their writings read like a monumental effort to avoid having
to confront the immorality of America's racist and unequal social
order. The revivalists need to get a grip: There will be no common
civic faith , no shared moral philosophy, no sense of common
humanity in America unless it is forged in a struggle for social justice.
B. Equality Causes Moral Decline

The exclusion of social justice from the revivalists' moral center
is bolstered by the habit of contrasting gains in social equality with
civic virtue. Proponents of civil society accuse civil rights movements
of contributing to the breakdown of civil society. In Liberal
Purposes , William Galston suggests a correlation between civil rights
and moral decay: "Although the civil rights movement is widely
acknowledged to have righted ancient wrongs, epidemics of crime,
drugs, and teenage pregnancy have exacted a fearful toll. " 71 The final
report of the National Commission on Civic R enewal opens by
contrasting increased economic opportunity with the country's
troubling civic and moral condition.72 The report acknowledges
briefly the link between economic misery and civic ills only to
discount its importance. 73 The authors' point is to distinguish between
civic and economic he alth and to place virtue and civic action above
economic well-being. 74
Civil society revivalists count declines in morality and social
capital as a cost exacted by improvements in economic and social
equality. They tend to balance advances made by women and
minorities against the social harms caused by civic disengagement and
moral disorder. Thus, James Q. 'Nilson weighs the abolition of
slavery and segregation as well as increased gender equity "against . ..
the increased tolerance of drug experimentation, the social
marginalization of religious believers, the heightened skepticism
about institutional authority, and a certain confusion over sexual
roles. " 75 Robert Putnam similarly offers a "rounded assessment of
71. W ILLI AM A . G ALSTON, LIB ERAL P URPOSES : GO ODS, V IRTUES, AN D DIVERSITY IN
THE L IB ERAL STATE 273 (1991) . G a lston has a hab it of poin tin g out the limits of struggle s fo r
r acia l equ a li t y.
72. NATIONAL C OIVIM'N ON CIVI C R ENEW AL, sup ra note 1, at 5.
73. See id. at 5-6.
74. See id. a t 7 .
75 . J AMES Q. WILSO N, Liberalism, Mode rnism , and rlz e Good Life, in SEE DBEDS OF
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changes in American social capital over the last quarter-century" that ,~
"counts the costs as well as the benefits of community engagement."76 · ~
He claims that the substantial decline in intolerance and overt 11
discrimination in recent decades "may be related in complex ways to 1
the erosion of traditional social capital. "77
·-~~
In addition, civil society revivalists devalue tools that ' j
l
disempowered people have used successfully to achieve greater ··1
inclusion in the social, economic, and political life of the nation. First i
the revivalists rarely list social movements among the kinds of
voluntary associations that constitute civil society. 78
Some \
79
affirmatively disparage them. Yet these associations of citizens who
struggled to make government more democratic were themselves
marvelous examples of civil society. More than most voluntary
groups, they were born from "the urge to which democratic civility
responds": the yearning for participation and self-determination.so
Social movements served as classic seedbeds of political activism and
civic engagement, providing "oppositional space" 81 for citizens to join
together to challenge state domination.
Paying more attention to voluntary groups that work outside the
dominant political apparatus highlights the important role of civil
society in struggles for self-determination and freedom. Because they
were excluded from both state-sanctioned and market sources of
social capital, Black Americans had to form their own intermediate
associations to make ends meet, to confront racial injustice, and to
agitate for inclusion. Political scientist Fredrick Harris describes the

1

VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERCIAN SOCIETY,
supra note 36, at 17, 29.
76. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65 , 75 (1995).
77. !d.
78. See Cohen, supra note 7, a t 69 (criticizing civic society revivalists for " discount[ing] the
new types of association, mobilization, and public engagement of the 1960s and 1970s, simply
because they differ from tradition al secondary associations" ); Harris, supra note 32, at 321 ("An
important omission in the civic renewal debate is the role social movements play in the nation's
civic life ."). See, e.g. , COUNCIL FOR CIVIL SOc'Y, supra note 1, at 8-9 (listing "book clubs, Little
League, the Future Farmers of America, the Kiwanis Club, the Girl Scouts, the Chamber of
Commerce, the Advertising Council. a nd the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People" as current examples of voluntary civic organizations).
79. See, e.g., E lshtai n, supra note 40, at 27-28 (criticizing movement politics as "inh erently
unstable, ephemeral, and geared toward publicity" and arguing that "decent" institutions are
preferable for building civic ties).
80. Hefner, supra note 9, at 27.
81. Jane Mansbridge, Us in g Power/Fighting Power: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 46-47 (Seyla Banhabib ed .,
1996) (describing " deliberative enclaves of resistance " ).
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dual function of Blacks' "oppositional civic culture": "[w]hile the
culture and institutions of marginal citizens perform [a traditional]
. civic role, they also transmit values that counter the dominant
society's ideology of subordination, and they employ these values to
justify and legitimize oppositional movements." 82 Black churches,
social clubs, and grass-roots political organizations have cultivated
norms that both support the dominant civic order and subvert its
white supremacist features.
Blacks have emphasized the civic role of their families as well:
while menial work outside the home was historically an aspect of
racial subjugation, the family was a site of solace from white
oppression. 83 Sociologists have also noted the importance of Black
families in preparing children to survive in a racist society by teaching
them a positive cultural identity that defies the racist stereotypes so
rampant in the dominant culture. 84 The practice of informal adoption
within the extended kinship network became a common mechanism
for Black families to rear children under difficult circumstances
without interference by the state. 85 It is unfortunate that the
revivalists' myopic focus on the marital family eclipses the many ways
in which Black families, who are less likely than whites to fit this
model, have served a classically civic function.
Black Americans' reason for participating in these civic projects
have much more to do with mistrust of the government, mainstream
social institutions, and institutionalized norms than the "civic trust"
that the revivalists exalt. For Blacks, observes Harris, "distrust in

82. Harris, supra note 32 , at 323-24. Robert Putnam , a leading civil society revivalist,
acknowledges that " [i]t would be a dreadful mistake, of course, to overlook th e repositories of
social capital within America's minority communities, " emphasizing the power of the church as
a resource for political engagement among Blacks. Robe rt D . Putna m , The Prosperous
Community: Social Capital and Public Life , AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1993, at 35, 40; see also DON
S. BROWNING, Altruism, Civic Virtue, and Religion , in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF
COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AN D CITIZENSHIP IN AM ERCIAN SOCIETY, supra note 36, at 12026 (describing how a Black Pentecostal church promotes civic virtue and engagement in a
Chicago n e ighborhood).
83. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WorviEN , RA CE & CLASS 17 (1983); see also JA CQUELINE
JO NES , LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND TH E FATVIILY
FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 12-13 (1985 ).
84. See, e.g. , Janice Hale, The Black Woman and Child-Rearing, in THE BLACK WOMAN
79, 80 (La F rances Rodge rs-Rose ed., 1980); JOY CE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMIL!ES: ADOPTING
ACROSS RA CIAL BOUNDARIES (1977).
85. See ANDREW BILLINGSLEY, CLIMBING JACOB 'S LAD DER: THE ENDURING LEGACY
OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES 29-35 (1992); ELMER P. MARTIN & JOANNE MITCH ELL
MARTIN, THE BLACK EXTENDED FAMILY 5-16 (1978); CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KI N:
STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVALIN A BLACK COMMUNITY 44-47,92-94 (1974).
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government has had a paradoxical link to CIVIC engagement."86
Research consistently shows that Blacks quite understandably have
higher levels of mistrust toward government institutions than most
Americans. 87 But this skepticism about the government generated an
intensity of Black political activism in the 1950s and 1960s that
surpassed that of whites. 88 Given the mediating function served by
voluntary associations, mistrust is a perfectly legitimate motivation to
draw citizens together for civic engagement. 89
How, then, can the revivalists pit the civil rights and women's
movements in opposition to civil society? These struggles seem to be
disqualified from the revivalists' place of honor because they used
disruptive tactics like boycotting businesses and joining protest
marches rather than more "civil" tools like voting (from which Blacks
and women were once officially barred) and forming recreational
clubs. More important, these social movements sought to radically
change the social order and achieved a modicum of success. The
revivalists' version of civil society, on the other hand, leaves the social
order intact while concentrating on moral decay.
Moreover, civil society revivalists denounce both the assertion of
rights and federal court decrees that provide long-term oversight of
rights enforcement. They slight the effective use of rights by
disenfranchised groups to rebel against social degradation and
demand recognition as full members of society. As Patricia vVilliams
explains: "For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights
is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a

86. Harris, supra note 32, at 20.
87. See id. For a discussion of differing racial attitudes about the crim inal justice syste m,
see generally KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CR IME: RACIAL H OAXES, WHITE
FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS
(1998).
88. See Harris, supra note 32, at 20; see also Richard D. Shingles, Black Consciousness and
Political Parricipation: The Missing Link, 75 AM . POL. SCI. REV. 76, 76 (1981). Black
Americans, on the other hand, have shown an incredible faith in the constitutional principles of
equality and freedom. On the paradox of Blacks ' fidelit y to the Constitution, see Dorothy E.
Roberts, The !'v!eaning of Blacks ' Fidelity to Lhe Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES 226 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds ., 1998)
("Blacks have no reason to have faith in the Constitution that was designed to exclude them; yet
they have remained faithful to the Constitution in the struggle for citizenship by relentlessly
demanding that its interpretation live up to its highest principles and follow its strictest
re quirements.").
89. Even middle-class citizens may be motiv ated by mistr ust. Katha Foilitt notes th a t she
and her ne ighbors joined the Parent Teacher's Association ·'to keep our kids from being shafte d
by the school system." Katha Pollitt, For Whom th e Ball Rolls, NATION, Apr. 15, 1996, at 9.
Pollitt also astutely adds, however, that the elite have good reason to trust the system: "[F]or
them, the system works. It 's made them rich and famo us." .ld.
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respect that places one in the referential range of self and others, that
elevates one's status from human body to social being." 90
In addition, the revivalists' emphasis on localism minimizes the
important role played by federal courts in dismantling official systems
of racial discrimination. To be sure, federally-enforced integration
strategies have failed to overturn structural impediments to change
and have devalued independent Black institutions and culture. 91
Federal court and legislative remedies are no substitute for
community organizing. Indeed, it was grass roots agitation during the
civil rights movement that spurred the federal government into
action. But one wonders whether the upheavals of the 1960s could
have taken place without social movements, rights assertion, and
federal court intervention in local white supremacist governments.
The revivalists' disdain for these tools deployed by subordinated
groups in their liberation struggles only reinforces the sense that the
new civil society cares little for the radical ends these groups sought
to achieve. Linking moral decline and equality in these ways not only
evades social cleavages; it may intensify them. This way of thinking
mimics the age-old pattern of attributing the deprivation of
disenfranchised groups to their own moral depravity, rather than to
societal inequalities. 92 Since the 1920s, sociologists have pointed to
the degeneracy and disintegration of the Black family to explain
Black poverty, crime, and unemployment. 93 Daniel Patrick Moynihan
notoriously popularized this thesis in 1965. H e described Black
culture as a "tangle of pathology" and declared, "[a]t the heart of the
deterioration of the fabric of the Negro society is the deterioration of
the Negro family." 94 Putting moral decline in the spotlight obscures
90. PATRICIA J. WILLI AMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RA CE AND RI GHTS 153 (1991). Othe r
Black legal scholars have disagree d with white critical legal studi es scholars o ver the significance
of rights. See, e.g., Anthony E. Coo k, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: Th e Reconstructive
Th eology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 H ARV. L. REv. 985, 992 (1990); Kimberle W.
Cre nshaw, Race, R eform , and R etren chm ent: Tran sformation and L egitimation in
A ntidiscriminarion Law, 101 H ARV. L. R EV. 1331 , 1357 (1988) (a rguing th a t liberal lega l
ideology "remains rece ptive to so me aspira tions that are ce ntral to B lack demands, an d may
also pe rform a n impo rtant fun c tion in comb a ting the e xpe ri e nce of be ing excl ud ed and
oppresse d").
91. See DERRICK BELL, AN D WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE E LUS IVE Q UEST FOR R ACIAL
J USTICE 102, 107·18 (1987) ; see also John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the K ern er
Commission Report: A Back-to-the-Fwure Essay , 7 1 N .C. L. RE V. 1487 , 1496-1501 (1 993).
92. See JOEL F. H ANDLER & Y EHESKEL HAS ENFELD, TH E M ORA L CONSTR UCTI ON OF
P OVERTY: WELFARE R E FORM IN A MERICA 132 (1991 ). See generally MICHAE L B. KATZ, THE
UN DESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFAR E (1 989).
93. See generally JOHN DOLLARD , CASTE AN D CLASS IN A SOUTHER N TOWN (1 937).
94. OFFICE OF P OLICY PLANN ING AND RESEARCH, U NITED STATES DEP'T OF L ABOR,
THE N EG RO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 5 ( 1965 ).
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the need for structural reform. It may build resentment against
subordinated groups who are often painted as irresponsible and
undeserving, and it may fortify privileged people in their resolve to
maintain the status quo.

II. WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE NEW CIVIL SOCIETY
The devaluation of social justice in the revivalists' moral vision
creates another type of exclusion. The revivalists' strategies to
implement their public values benefit privileged groups the most and
disadvantage those at the bottom. As Robert Hefner learned from
studying the modern European experience with civil society, the
failure to attend to the "institutional nest that supports democratic
civility" tends to produce segmentary freedoms that are enjoyed by
only a portion of the populace. 95 The revivalists' agenda reflects a
stratified approach to state coercion in citizens' lives that parallels its
exclusive moral vision. 96 The revivalists' moral exclusivity affects the
extent to which they see state interference in citizens' lives as an
appropriate means of fostering civil society. Revivalists promote civil
society's function of avoiding a state-dominated existence for citizens
who conform to their moral ideology. On the other hand, they
overlook or even advocate state regulation of non-conforming
citizens.
This second form of exclusivity especially structures civil society
revivalists' recommendations for the family. Revivalists highlight the
degeneration of child-raising families as the most pernicious of civic
ills. 97 Under many conceptions of civil society, the family is "the most

95. See Hefner, supra note 9, at 17-26. Hefner attributes the lack of conce rn for
sociological realism in the recent acade mic re newal of interes t in civil society to its o rigins in
political philosophy rather than sociology or anthropology.
96. Or maybe the revivalists have just jumped o n the prevailing po litica l bandwago n,
recognizing that "any project that entails go vernment acting in the broad national interest
(ra ther than in the narrowe r inte rest of the suburban middle class) probably won't get done."
Nicholas Lemann. The New A merican Consensus: Government of, by and fo r th e Comfortable:
The Sm allness of Centrism , N.Y. TIMES MAG ., N ov. 1, 1998, a t 37, 41. The civil society agenda
fits nicely into the new D emocratic-R epublican politics th at appeals primarily to suburban
fam ilies by supporting "mainly lo w-cost gove rnme nt initiatives that signal empathy with middleclass families who felt embattled , in the social rathe r than economic sense: th e V-chip to screen
ou t Internet porno graph y, extended family leave, school uniforms. " !d. at 42 . I a m inde bted to
Dan Lewis for brin ging to my attention the rev ivalists' affinity for this politica l consensus.
97. See, e.g., Ma ry Ann Gl endon , Fo rgotten Questions , in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES
OF COMPETENCE, CH AR ACTER , AND CITIZENSHI P IN AMERCIAN SOCIETY, supra note 36, at 1,
3 (" (T]he simulta neous weakening of child-raising fa milies and their surrounding and
supporting institutions constitutes our culture's mos t seri o us long- term proble m.").
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fundamental form of social capital," 98 and one of the principal
associations that shield the individual from the power of the state.
This is a fairly uncontroversial tenet of civil society philosophy.
Forces that weaken families, then, threaten the health of civil society;
addressing these forces should be an important goal for public policy
in a civil society. Civil society revivalists take this proposition one
controversial step further by identifying divorce and single parenting
as the chief agents of family degeneration and by prescribing
marriage as the cure. 99 Underlying this diagnosis is the norm of the
heterosexual nuclear family.
Civil society revivalists place marriage at the center of their
agenda as the essence of family virtue and the ideal context for the
moral education of children.l00 A Call to Civil Society elevates the
marriage bond to "the first and most important gift we give to our
children." 101 The Index of National Civic Health includes divorce and
non-marital births as the only family components used to measure
civic well-being. 102 Even if we agree that marriage provides certain
advantages to children (a highly disputed claim), 103 can it really be the
virtually singular means for a civil society to strengthen families?
Certainly there are many other ways in which family ties are
weakened besides divorce and unwed childbearing. By singling out
the decline in marriage, civil society revivalists minimize sources of
family insecurity that stem more directly from social inequalities, such
98. Putn am , supra note 76, at 73 .
99. See Harris, supra note 32, at 321 (" An impo rtant omission in the civic renewal debate is
the ro le social moveme nts pl ay in the natio n's civic life. "); see also CO UNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y,
supra note 1, a t 18; NATION AL COMM'N ON CIVIC R ENEWAL, supra note 1, a t 13.
100. See, e.g., David Blanke nhorn , The Possibility of Civil Society , in SEE DBEDS OF VIRTUE:
SO URCES OF COMPETENCE , CHARACTER , AND CITIZENS HIP IN AME RC IAN SOCIETY, supra
note 36, at 271, 280. ("The centerpiece goal of a civil socie ty stra tegy sho uld be to stre ngthen
marriage as a social institution- to increase the pro portion of children who grow up with two
married pare nts and decrease the pro portion who do not. ").
101. COUNCIL ON CIVIL Soc'Y, supra no te 1, a t 19; see also Bl ankenh o rn, supra note 100, at
280 ("The ce nterpiece goal of a civil society strategy should be to strengthe n marriage as a social
institution - to increase the proportion of children who grow up with two married pare nts and
decrease the proportion who do not. " ).
102. Se e N ATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC R ENEWAL, supra note 1, at 24.
103. See generally LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF F ATHERL ESSNESS IN AMERICA
(Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 1998) (collecting dive rge nt po ints of view about the impact of
fath e rl cssness on children and social order). Judith Stacey, for exa mple , asse rts th a t "the claim
that social scientists have achie ved a co nsensus on the da nge rs of fath erlessness . . . is
catego rically false. " Judith Stacey, Dada-ism in th e 1990s: Getting Past Baby Talk Abuut
Fath erlessn ess, in LOST FATHERS THE POLITICS OF F ATHERLESSN ESS IN AM ERICA , supra , at 64.
No social scie nce research has demonstrated "or even atte mpted to d e mo nstrate" that childre n
living in radica lly diverse "fath erless" family structures have a grea ter risk of being inadequately
pare nted tha n children raised by hete rosexu al marrie d couples . !d. at 66.
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as family poverty, removal of children from their parents by the state,
and domestic violence.
The revivalists also fail to sufficiently interrogate the relationship
between marriage and economic inequality, and its implications for
public policy. Social science research linking single motherhood to
negative outcomes for children, such as poverty and delinquency, is
subject to differing causal interpretations. 104 The revivalists hold that
these outcomes are caused by family structure rather than by
difficulties experienced by female-headed households arising from
gender, race, and economic inequities. Nor do civil society revivalists
sufficiently attend to . the economic reasons for the decline in
marriage. Chronic poverty is not conducive to forming stable marital
The stresses and dislocations of unemployment make
bonds.
sustained partnerships difficult; jobless men do not make attractive
husbands. William Julius Wilson makes a convincing case that high
rates of Black female-headed households are tied directly to Black
male unemployment, which is more th an double that of whites, along
with changing norms concerning marriage. 105
Moreover, Black fathers' inability to contribute financially to
their families does not improve with marriage. Asserting that
marriage is the most efficacious solution to Black child poverty only
masks the shameful facts about Black Americans' unequal economic
status.
In reality, the correlation between race and poverty overshadows
the correlation between fatherlessn ess and poverty. A Black child
whose father is present is still likely to fare worse than a white child
raised by a single mother. In other words, racial inequality, "not
:fatherlessness," is the leading cause of Black children's deprivation.
Pretending that Black poverty is the fault of absent Black fathers
provides a defense against addressing America 's institutionalized
racism. 106
104. See gen erally LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN At-.·IER!CA, supra
note 103. For a nother refut ation of negative claims about fa th e rlessness, see generally NANCY
E. DOWD, IN DEFE NS E OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1997).
105. See WILSON, supra note 59, at 120-21; see also WILLLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN
WORK DISAPPEARS : THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
106. Dorothy Robe rts. The Absent Black Far her, in LOST fATHERS: THE P OLITICS OF
FATHERLESSNESS JN AM ERICA. supra n o te 103. at 157 (relyi ng o n SARA M CLANAHAN &
GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WlTH A SINGLE PARE NT: W HAT H URTS, WHAT HELPS 85
(1 994)). McL anahan and Sandefur observe: " It is important to remember that Black children in
two-parent families have much higher poverty rates th an white children in single-parent
families. He nce, if there were no single-parent families, Black children would still have much
higher pove rty rates than w hite children. " MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra at 85.
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Regulating families to make them conform to the marital norm is
no substitute for a more equitable distribution of wealth and
privilege. A civil society agenda, then, would more effectively
strengthen families "including, but not limited to, marital ones" by
including strategies that more directly remedy gender, economic and
racial inequality.
By promoting a particular family type, moreover, the revivalists
indirectly weaken families that do not fit their mold. Their policy
recommendations that reward marriage, such as tax code reforms,
penalize parents who are not married. 107 Even if they do not intend it,
praising marriage as the only virtuous environment for raising
children stigmatizes female-headed families. It diverts resources
away from the very households that need them most. As women's
studies professor Judith Stacey argues, "[m]ost social science
evidence, like common sense ... suggests that the chief handicaps
unwed mothers face are deficits of time, money, and social
support . .. deficits for which there are much better social remedies
than moral opprobrium." 108 Civil society revivalists are banking on
the reestablishment of marriage to cure these handicaps at some
future date. In the meantime, their virtual abandonment of nonmarital families overlooks the civic function these parents are
currently struggling to perform.
As already suggested, the revivalists ' exclusive family agenda has
a distinct race and class bias. Its proposed mechanisms for rewarding
parental care benefit primarily middle-class families who earn enough
to take advantage of them. A t the same time that the revivalists
advocate tax perks for middle-class, stay-at-home moms, welfare
reform discourse vilifies poor mothers who care for their children at
home as new state laws push them into the workforce, often without
adequate child care. 109 Far from reaping government benefits for
spending more time with their children , these mothers are severely
sanctioned if they fail to meet a host of job-related requirements.110

107. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 19.
108. Stace y, supra note 103, at 70.
109. See G WENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE 'S E ND 103-14 (1998).
110. Sh e ryl! Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and rh e Min o rity Poo r: Accountin g fo r th e
Tyranny of Sw 1e Majo rities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 604-05 (1999) (" The vas t majo rity o f sta tes
now permit narrowe r exemptions from work requireme nts ... a nd th ey now imp ose stricter
sancti o ns fo r non-compliance with the work requireme nt than we re im posed under the old
regime. " ); Ba rbara Vobejda & Judith Ha vemann , Sanclions: A Fo rce Behin d Falling Welfare
Rolls; Srates A re Cutting Off Tens of Thous ands W ho Don 't Seek Wo rk or Follo w Rules, WASH.
POST, M arch 23, 1998, at A 1.
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Yet civil society revivalists make no mention of these welfare reform ,
measures deliberately designed to disadvantage "at-home parentai .t;
care of children. " 111 The only recognition of welfare reform comes in
the suggestion that governors and state legislatures use publi~ "
assistance programs to promote marriage. 112 This version of civil
society not only devalues the parent-child relationship in poor·
female-headed homes, but encourages state intrusion in these home~ "'
to promote official moral standards.
·'
Finally, civil society revivalists advocate measures that will
"enhance parental authority in the upbringing of children. " 113 Whose •
parental authority? Dramatic changes in policies governing public · j
assistance and child welfare are converging to increase state ·
supervision of poor children, especially those who are Black. 114 Yet · 1
the revivalists seem oblivious to these trends. In addition to rules 1
promoting work, new welfare measures condition public aid on
parents' compliance with a variety of rules regarding children.l15 j
These indigent parents are subject to a level of state interference in Ii
child raising that middle-class parents would never tolerate and that · 1
violates basic tenets of civil society.
Given the revivalists' inattention to systemic inequality, it comes
as no surprise that the only recommendation related to the child
welfare system (a system that regulates poor families almost
exclusively) is to strengthen and expand the institution of adoption,
Adoption is an important
including trans-racial adoption. 116
institution in civil society, revivalists argue, because it insures more
children will grow up with two married parents. 117 By choosing to
bolster adoption without mentioning programs that preserve the
families of children in foster care, the revivalists favor the more
privileged adoptive parents. Apparently, parents whose children
have been removed by the state are less deserving of social support

i

l

11 1. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 19.
112. See id. at 20.
113. !d. at 23.
114. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text; see also Gwendolyn Mink, Aren't Poor
Single Mothers Women?: Feminists, Welfare R eform, and Welfare Juscice , in WHOSE WELFARE?
171 , 172 (Gwe ndolyn Mink ed. , 1999) (noting that welfare work requirements deny poor
mothers parental choices abo ut whether and how much outside employment is compatible with
the needs of children).
115. See Lucy A. Williams, Th e Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 719 (1992).
116. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL S OC'Y, supra note 1, at 26: see also NATIONAL COMM'N ON
CIVI C RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 13 (advocating "sweep ing away impediments to adoption").
117. See COUNCIL ON C IVIL SOC' Y, supra note 1, at 26.
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because they are less likely to be married. But adoption should be a
·":· · last resort for addressing child neglect and deprivation in a civil
;·r _· society. Of course the state has a duty to protect children from harm
within families, and should usually facilitate the adoption of children
whose family ties have been irremediably fractured. But states
promote children's welfare best by supporting impoverished families.
At the very least, scholars interested in protecting families from state
domination should acknowledge that foster care constitutes a form of
state supervision of poor and minority children, and that adoption
typically involves government disruption of their relationship with
. their parentS. 118
The revivalists' claim that adoption has been "significantly
weakened in recent years" is simply wrong. 119 What has been
weakened by recent state and federal legislation is the national
commitment to preserve ties between poor parents and their children.
In November 1997, President Clinton signed the Adoption and Safe
Families Act ("ASFA") 120 aimed at doubling the number of children
adopted annually by 2002. 121 The Act represents a striking shift in
federal child welfare philosophy from an emphasis on the
reunification of children in foster care with their biological families
toward the adoption of these children into new families. 122 The Act's
preference for adoption is implemented through swifter timetables
for terminating the rights of biological parents to "free " children for
adoption and the provision of technical assistance to states to
facilitate adoptions. 123 The Act also gives states financial incentives to
move more children into adoptive homes. 124 Although ASF A retains
118. See generally Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. RE V. 423
(1983) (arguing that states unjustifiably terminate parent's rights to maintain contact with
children in foster care to free these children for adoption ).
119. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y , supra note 1, at 26.
120. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101 , 111 Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified in sca ttered sections of 42 U.S.C.) .
121. See Cheers fo r New La w on Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1997, at A 24. Preside nt
Clinton 's Adop tion Initiative called on the D epartment of H ea lth and Human Services to
prepare an age nda to remove barriers to adoption and included a 1998 budget request of $10
million to assist states in meeting the Adoption Initiative's goals. See U.S. D ep't of Health &
Human Servs., A doption 2002: A Response to the Presidenti al Executive Memorandum on
Adop tion Issued Dec. 14, 1996 (1997).
122. I explore this shift in child welfa re policy more fully. Dorotht Roberts, fs Th ere Ju stice
in Children 's Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy , U. PA. J. CONST. L.
(forthcoming 2000).
123. Social Securit y Act, 42 U.S. C.§§ 675(5)(C)-(E), 673(b )(i) (1999).
124. Unde r ASFA, the federal government pays states $4000 multiplied by the amount by
which the num ber of foster child adoptions in the state during th e fisca l yea r exceeds a ba se
number of fo ster child adoptions. !d. § 673b(d)(l)(A). The government pays $2000 for each
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the requirement that states make reasonable efforts to r
children with their families, it encourages concurrent efforts to
these children with adoptive parents. 125
The passage of AFSA corresponded with
disparagement of mothers receiving public assistance
we
reform's retraction of the federal safety net for poor children.l26 The
rejection of public aid to poor families in favor of private solutions to
poverty, such as marriage and child support enforcement, is mirrored·
in the appeal to adoption to reduce the burgeoning foster care
population. The intersection of these federal welfare and adoption ,
reform laws marks the first time in this nation's history that "states ·
have a federal mandate to protect children from abuse and neglect,
but no corresponding mandate to provide basic economic support to
poor families." 127 The act was also tied to the growing interest in
removing barriers to white middle-class couples' ability to adopt,
especially race-matching adoption policies. 128 Thus, the civil society ·
revivalists' policy recommendations merely endorse the existing
consensus to reject any national effort to address the systemic causes
of children's deprivation, and to pursue instead the private remedies
of marriage and adoption.
Like Congress, the revivalists have misidentified the problem
with the U.S. child welfare system. The injustice of foster care does
not stem from the small number of children being adopted; it stems
from the large number of children removed from their homes.
Virtually all of these children are poor and a startling percentage are
Black. 129 In 1996, Black children made up forty-five percent of the
foster care population although they were only fifteen percent of the

adoption of a special needs child. Id. § 673b(d)(1)(B).
125 . States may concurrently "identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family" to
adopt the child. Jd. § 675(5)(e).
126. See MINK, supra note 109, at 123-24.
127. Martha Matthews, Assessing the Impact of Welfare Reform on Child Welfare,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 395.
128. See Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 5115(a) (repealed 1996)
(prohibiting agencies receiving federal funding from placing children according to race); see also
Civil Rights Act, 42 U .S.C. § 1996(b) (prohibiting agencies receiving federal funding from
denying anyone the opportunity to become an adoptive or foster parent from delaying or
denying the placement of a child on the basis of race).
129. See DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 155 (1994) ("[l]nadequacy of
income more than any other factor, constitutes the reason that children are removed."); see also
RENNY GOLDEN , DISPOSABLE CHILDREN: Atv!ERICA'S WELFARE SYSTEM 13-62 (1997). See
generally LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1989) (criticizing the removal of
poor children from their homes for parental neglect).
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general population under age eighteen.13° In the nation's urban
· centers, the racial disparity is even worse. Chicago's foster care
· population, for example, is almost ninety percent Black.l 31 Of 42,000
children in foster care in New York City, less than 2000 are white. 132
once Black children enter foster care, they remain there longer, are
moved more often, and receive less desirable placements than white
children. 133 Even if all of the thousands of Black children in foster
care were adopted tomorrow, there would still be a problem.
The focus on adoption as the solution to the foster care crisis
directs attention away from the excessive state removal of poor Black
children from their homes. A civil society should be wary of state
solutions to social problems that rely on terminating parents' rights,
rather than on reducing poverty or building stronger supports for
families. These efforts should include both national policies capable
of ensuring children's material welfare and community-based
programs designed to preserve families . The revivalists' turn to
adoption as the only strategy for improving the child welfare system is
further illustration of their moral exclusivity.
CONCLUSION

A recent reminder of the challenge racism poses for civil society
is the scene of white housewives stationed along South Boston streets
shouting "niggers, go home" at buses of Black children arriving under
a 1974 fe deral school desegregation plan. 134 Brent Staples notes that
these housewives had their defenders: "At the time, community
leaders like Louise Day Hicks and State Representative \:Villiam
Bulgar portrayed Southie as a 'family-oriented community' where
people weren't really racist, just concerned about controlling their
schools and the lives of their children. " 135 According to these
130. A dministration for Children and Families et aL, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Sen's.,
How Many Children Were in Fo ster Care on ,'.I arch 31, 1998 (visited Mar. 6, 2000) <http ://www.
acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/stats/a r0199a.htm> .
131. See P ATRICK MURPHY, WASTED 96 (1997).
132. i\;!artin Guggenheim , The Foster Care Dilemma and What 10 Do About It: Is the
Problem rhat Too M any Children Are E ntering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 144
(1999).
133. See generally Edmund Mech , Public So cial Services to jvfino rity Children and Th eir
Fam ilies , in CHILDREN IN NEED OF ROOTS (R. O. W ashington & Joan Baros-Van Hull eds.,
1985).
134. See Brent Staples, A Prayer f or rhe Dead , N .Y. T IMES BOOK R EV ., Oct. 3, 1999, at 3
(reviewing M ICH AEL PATRICK MACDONALD, ALL SOULS: A FAMILY STORY FROM SOUTHIE
(1999)).
135. !d.
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' lj

'j
politicians, their neighbors were simply guarding civil society.
j
Today's civil society advocates would certainly condemn the ., .l
housewives' bigotry as well as the vulgar methods they employed to J
preserve their civic circle. Yet the revivalists' conception of civil · 1
society would embrace the father-headed homes in which these l
women raised their children as well as the mothers' objective to shield
parental authority from federal intrusion. Their model does little on
the other hand, to reverse the forces that made the children and
housewives enemies. It upholds a community cohesiveness centered
around marital families and a mythical shared civic faith while
glossing over the deep-seated hatreds and injustices that really
corrode the ideal of equal human dignity. A different strategy is
needed to ensure that the Southie view of civil society does not
prevail. Only by recognizing America's obscene social inequities as
our chief moral problem and a critical threat to the institutions of civil
society will the revivalists make "the commitment to freedom and
justice for all" something more than nice-sounding words.

